Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Mitzvah Manslaughter Excluded? PT III

Ravina's קושיא on Rava is answered!
Recall that Ravina asked: If you are correct, Rava
--that if it is not a mitzvah to re-cut wood if you have found pre-cut wood for a Succah or the altar,
--then even if you do not find pre-cut wood, cutting the wood yourself would not be an inherent mitzvah,

then it should follow that ........
-- if a child is learning there is no mitzvah to administer physical force to him
-- therefore, even when a child is not learning/behaving well, it is not a mitzvah to administer physical force

However, we see from our mishna that the administering of physical force in the case of a father, rebbe etc - is considered a mitzvah, and thereby exempts the rebbe, father, from Galut!

Rava's answer:
Your equation is incorrect, because it presumes that there is no mitzvah to adminster force when the child is "in line".  Quoting a pasuk in משלי, Rava establishes that there is an ongoing mitzvah for a parent/rebbe to be "on guard" and to provide pre-emptive physical force if need be to child and student.  We can therefore say that the mitzvah to discipline a child is an inherent mitzvah, unlike the woodchopping case.

Rava then says לאו מילתא היא דאמרי.  Although Rava seems to be retracting his previous proof given to the talmid, Rashi explains that Rava merely means that he has an "even better proof" from the pasuk itself.  It hinges on the expression ואשר יבא את רעהו ביער - where the word אשר implies, for Rava - a voluntary activity.  He entered the forest voluntarily, and not out of a mitzvah obligation.  That's how we know that the חטבת עצים is a רשות - and only in that kind of case is there Galut, to exclude a case of mitzvah...

The latest stage in the Gemara is the problem raised with that from a pasuk dealing with entering the Bet Hamikdash in a state of טומאה.  Before tonight's shiur, if possible - please review the latest step in the Gemara so that we can begin the shiur with it.
See you tonight for our second last shiur of the season!

Monday, December 20, 2010

Sunday Matinee Shiur in a Nutshell

The new sugyah at the bottom of ח., that we began in our Sunday Matinee shiur - deals with the din of Abba Shaul in the mishna: Abba Shaul states the following: Just as יער is רשות, so too, all רשות, to exclude a case of a father who hits a son (and G-d forbid, kills him) a rebbe who hits a student, and a שליח ב"ד (Rashi: while delivering 40 lashes required by the halacha).  These three scenarios are cases in which the force is being exerted in the context of a mitzvah (father and rebbe - education; Shaliach B"D - halachic punishment in court) and the Torah never intended to legislate the laws of עיר מקלט in such cases.

The ההוא מרבנן - a student in the yeshiva asked Rava: how do we (ie how does Abba Shaul) know that the Torah is speaking about a non-mitzvah woodchopper case? Maybe the Torah is speaking about the cutting of trees for the מזבח or for a Succah - and still the Torah says that one who does so and, in that context, unintentionally kills, should go to Galut?

We explained that the effect of this קושיא, were it to be successful, would be to torpedo the three exceptions of Abba Shaul - thus sending a father, rebbe, and Shaliach Bet Din to the Galut of an עיר מקלט!


Rava's answer back to the student is:
If you found trees already cut, there would be no mitzvah to cut them again to prepare them for the מזבח or for a Succah.  Unlike other areas of halacha, where a component of a mitzvah (matzah, tefillin etc) is to form the object לשמה - for the sake of the mitzvah - in order for it to be kosher, there is no such precondition with the wood of the altar or a Succah.
If so, Rava reasons, there is no intrinsic mitzvah to cut the wood even if you had to do so from scratch. 


How does this answer the student's question?
We explained: All wood cutting - including Succah and altar woodcutting is in the halachic realm of רשות ie non-mitzvah.  The יער case of the Torah is the paradigm for non-mitzvah activities resulting in death - triggering Galut.  This therefore explains Abba Shaul's drasha - that the rebbe, parent, or Shaliach BD, would be exempt from Galut since they are involved in mitzvot.

Tonight, we will deal with the איתיביה of Ravina on Rava - in which Ravina introduces our mishna to disprove Rava's response to the talmid.  Should Ravina's contradiction stand, Rava's answer would fall, the talmid's קושיא would be reinstated, and Abba Shaul's drasha would be in question.

See you in shiur!

Sunday, December 19, 2010

סותר את כותלו - sugyah summary!

The Gemara's objection to the "wall destruction" scenario is that such a person should have checked (who was in the public domain) prior to breaking the wall down.  Not doing so is grossly negligent, קרוב למזיד, and therefore dissimilar to the woodchopper case.  We proposed that the distinction here lies in the probability of people frequenting the forest vs. the public domain; although the woodchopper goes to an עיר מקלט, the likelihood of  hitting someone is low, but still present.  A Woodchopper's failure to take the precautions therefore remains on the level of שוגג and therefore חייב גלות.  The same lack of care of  a person demolishing a wall next to the רשות הרבים will likely produce an injury/death.  This level of liability cannot be atoned for in an עיר מקלט.

The Gemara then proposes an additional אוקימתא: that this all happened at night; by establishing this new fact, the Gemara hoped to bring it "closer" to the שוגג case of the Torah.  This was rejected by the Gemara's insistence that one at night, one would still have the same standard of care!  We gave two possible explanations as to what the Gemara could have been thinking in its הוא אמינא (assumption) and its מסקנא (conclusion):

a) In the הוא אמינא, the Gemara felt that the fewer people who frequent the רשות הרבים at night takes away the status of רשות הרבים and thereby equates it to the forest case of the Chumash.  The מסקנא holds that in the average public domain, nighttime does not reduce the amount of the passersby enough to justify the change of halachic status of the domain; it therefore remains קרוב למזיד
b) In the הוא אמינא, the Gemara felt that the fewer people who frequent the רשות הרבים at night takes away the status of רשות הרבים and thereby equates it to the forest case of the Chumash.
The מסקנא holds that once a public domain, always a public domain.  In other words - and as Carlos suggested in a move that won him the title of honorary Litvak - the sidewalk/street holds on to the "din" of רשות הרבים, and that halachic status simply does not fluctuate depending on the time of day.

This left us with the original problem in the mishna - what is הזורק את האבן לרה"ר גולה mean?  The Gemara re-couches the רשות הרבים as an אשפה - or a dump.  This is questioned: What's the scenario - היכי דמי? If many people pass through this dump, then the person is a פושע - grossly negligent - and the person would not go to an עיר מקלט; if people don't pass through, then the person is an אנוס, and therefore, blameless for the death!

Rav Pappa explains that it is a dump that people use as a bathroom at night, and not in the day.  The event happened during the daytime: Since it is not the typical time people come to use the bathroom, the case is not קרוב למזיד/פושע; since, however, they sometimes come to use it during the day - it is שוגג and not אנוס.  Therefore, the mishna's case is similar to the case of the Torah, ie the forest....

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Galut - What is Considered a Woodchopper Case?

Last night we began a new mishna on Makkot 8a.

Before starting the mishna, we gave a brief introduction to the different categories of action and what the Torah's response/consequences are for each action:

אונס - totally uncontrollable situation - unforeseen circumstances, no גלות, no death penalty
שוגג - "accident" - of the type in the Chumash in the Woodchopper situation - גלות
קרוב למזיד - negligence, more severe, higher standard of care than woodchopper case - no גלות, no death penalty
מזיד - deliberate murder - with התראה - death penalty

The mishna says that one who throws a rock into the public domain goes to an עיר מקלט ie galut.  This is troubling to the Gemara - which instantly exclaims - מזיד הוא! We explained that the Gemara doesn't literally mean that the person has committed a level 4 offense for which the action would be punishable by death.  Rather, the Gemara is saying this is an action which is קרוב למזיד which גלות does not redress.  Why, then, does the mishna say that he goes to galut?

The Gemara's answer is that the case of our mishna is that he was destroying his wall (and a rock flew off into the Reshut Harabim and killed someone) Apparently, this is meant to reduce the קרוב למזיד aspect, and to align it with the woodchopper case of the Torah. The question is how? One explanation is that, like the woodchopper case,it is not inevitably going to cause a death; it is a productive activity that entails risk, as does the case of the Torah.  Therefore, when the accident does happen, it is considered שוגג and the person is sent to Galut. 

We finished the class with the Gemara's objection to this answer, by noting איבעי ליה לעיוני - he should have paid attention/looked out! The Gemara feels that the "wall" case therefore is dissimilar to the case of the Torah, and the question is what is the distinction to which the Gemara is pointing?

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Edut Meyuchedet - Concluding Remarks

Last night, we tried to understand R. Pappa's kashya on Abaye in more depth:
We noted that there was apparently both a strength and a weakness in viewing it - one after another - from the same window.
The weakness: they each seem to have seen "half an act"
The strength: they are seeing it from the same window, and apparently know of one another, so there is more of a connection between them here than in the case of simultaneous viewing from separate windows.

The baraita quoted in the תניא נמי הכי seems to imply that the non-joining - צירוף - of the witnesses in the one window - זה אחר זה case - is a bigger chiddush: In other words, even once we know that the two window case doesn't generate a merger of testimonies, we may still have thought the one window case would generate such a merger.  The baraita comes to tell us that not even the second case works.

Rav Pappa's difficulty with the baraita is that the second case seems to be weaker: Ie that there is more of a reason to veto a merger in case #2 since each side saw only half a מעשה!  Why, then, is it presented in the baraita as a bigger chiddush, more of a surprise?

Abaye responds by saying that the סיפא is dealing with a case of elicit sexual relations, and, as Rashi explains (presumably because the act can extend for longer than a moment) each witness views "an entire act".  Now, the only variable that distinguishes the first case from the baraita and the second is the two-window/one-window distinction.  In the two window case, we are told there is no צירוף because the parties do not see each other.  But we may have thought in a one-window case, since they were presumably aware of each other (they came one after the other) and they each saw a whole act ------that there were would be a merging of the eduyot.  The baraita's chiddush is that despite this, there is not a merger.  They literally must be mutually aware of each other at a SIMULTANEOUS SIGHTING.
Rava then informs us that there is another way we can merge the eduyot: through one ed of each group viewing the מתרה - the guy warning in the middle.  We got into a longer discussion of whether or not the מתרה is functioning as a halachic מתרה, and this was contingent on the machloket between R. Yosi and (possibly) Tanna Kamma.  Perhaps according to R. Yossi, the מתרה in this kind of a case would simply be someone, although not functioning as an ed, is a "merging force" between the two groups.

We finished the shiur with Rav Nachman's assertion that though edut meyuchedet is pasul in dinei nefashot, it works in dinei mammonot/monetary laws.  This is challenged in the form of a מתקיף לה. Tonight's shiur will begin with a review of this קושיא -  see you there!

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Edut Meyuchedet

At the end of the mishna, the Tanna cites an alternate interpretation of על פי שנים עדים - namely: that the Sanhedrin should not hear the testimony of the edim via a תורגמן- translator.  The words על פי are now understood as "directly from the mouths of the edim" - to the court.

In summary, we have a number of possible explanations of the expression:
a) At its simplest level, this is an expression indicating that the testimony regarding the case must be uttered to the court by two witnesses.
b) R. Yosi: the פה referred to here is the mouth of the witnesses as those who must warn the accusued of the ramifications of his actions.  According to this view, the expression in relating to a stage PRIOR to testimony in Bet Din, at the event itself.  The edim must utter the warning, and not a third party
c) דבר אחר - last view in the mishna: edim must utter the testimony directly to the court, and not via a translator.

The Gemara begins with a related, but not identical issue as that raised in the body of the mishna: עדות מיוחת: simultaneous, but not joint, viewing of the murder.  Instead of the mishna's case - in which there was a full "כת" of edim in each window, viewing the event, there was only one עד in each window, but neither one saw each other.  Rav Zutrah bar Tuvyah's goal is to prove that such an 'edut' is invalid.  His source is our pasuk על פי שנים עדים; at the very end of the pasuk, the Torah reads לא יומת על פי עד אחד.  Rav Zutrah shows us his logic - by first discounting the simple pshat - ie that the Torah is invalidating the testimony of a single witness in capital cases.  How so? That halacha is already implied in the רישא,  opening of the pasuk: after all, if two edim are required, one is insufficient!  Therefore, the end of the pasuk refers to a total of two witnesses, but who viewed the event independent of one another; the pasuk relates to the number of edim in the context of the viewing of the event, not the actual testimony....Such an edut is invalid.

The gemeara confirms Rav Zutrah's halacha by citing a supporting baraita that ends with the following logic :  not only two simultaneous viewings are not "mitztaref" (joined) to form one edut, but even two people who viewed an event from the same window, one after the other, are not "mitztaref" to form one edut.

Rav Pappa raises an objection to Abaye: This is not a bigger "chiddush" - but it flows as a קל וחומר of the first halacha: In the first case, each witness saw the entire act and the edut was still not formed - how much moreso when each witness each saw half the act.........

Monday, December 13, 2010

Summary of Sunday's shiur

Last night's shiur focused on the new mishna at the top of ו:

The case:
A murder case in which two sets of witnesses each saw a murder take place, with a fifth person, known as the מתרה - the "warner" standing next to the murderer below.  The mishna defines the two groups of witnesses as two separate entities when no one witness in each of the groups sees a witness of the other group.  However, if even one witness of group A sees a witness of group B, they are viewed as one group. 

Ramifications:
According to (a re-worded) Rashi, the נפקא מינה, ramification, bears on the halacha of עדים זוממים.  We know that in a group of witnesses, none are killed כאשר זמם unless all of them are הוזם.  Therefore, if the two sets of witnesses are linked (as explained above) they are deemed to be one group ---and even if two are הוזם, they are 'saved' by virtue of their connection with the two that were not הוזם.  If they do not see each other, then their separate status allows one כת to be executed while the other is saved.  This latter scenario is what is meant by the mishna, when it says הוא והן נהרגין.  He (the accused) is killed because there is still one set of kosher witnesses implicating him; the כת that is הוזם is killed, however, since they were subject to an עמנו הייתם attack edut....

Tosafot adds to the discussion: he points out that if they are deemed to be one group, we also invalidate the edut of all of them based on the presence of one קרוב or פסול. Here, he uses the term נמצא אחד מהם - ie one of the edim was found to be an invalid witness; he then adds what Rashi says, using the term נמצא אחת מהן - one of the groups of edim was found to be זוממת - they are not killed, but rather "saved" by the non-הוזם group.  Tosafot continues to note that if one of the two groups of edim is הוזם ,it also collapses the edut of the other group - explaining that it impacts in a parallel way as does a  קרוב או פסול on an edut of which it is a part.  We inferred from Tosafot, however, that if one of the edim was הוזם, the edut would not collapse.  Why? Whereas a קרוב או פסול is intrinsically problematic (and therefore has the ability to collapse the whole edut) - an עד זומם is irrelevant on his own.   Just as עדים זוממים are punished only when the two of them are הוזם, so, too, a single ed zomem is inconsequential.  Borrowing a concept from ג. - a single ed zomem can still rightfully assert that he is telling the truth and the מזימים are lying - so his presence in an edut of four is innocuous...the accused is killed, none of the edim are executed,and his הוזם status does not collapse the edut!